Does market structure influence price transmission in the agro-food sector? by Bakucs, Lajos Zoltán et al.
Does Market Structure Influence Price
Transmission in the Agro-food Sector?
A Meta-analysis Perspective
Zoltan Bakucs, Jan Fałkowski and Imre Fert}o
(Original submitted January 2013, revision received June 2013, accepted July
2013.)
Abstract
There exists a large literature on price transmission in agro-food sectors. However,
a great majority of empirical studies focus on the existence of asymmetry and, by
and large, do not investigate the reason for its presence or absence. This is in sharp
contrast to the theoretical literature that provides a number of explanations of why
we should expect (a)symmetry. In response, this paper investigates the reasons for
asymmetric price transmission in the agro-food chain, using meta-analysis of exist-
ing studies. Our focus is on the organizational and institutional characteristics of
the agro-food supply chain. Our findings suggest that asymmetric price transmis-
sion in farm–retail relationships is more likely to occur in sectors/countries with
more fragmented farm structure, higher governmental support and more restrictive
regulations on price controls in the retail sector. On the other hand, more restric-
tive regulations on entry barriers in the retail sector and the relative importance of
the sector tend to promote symmetric farm–retail price transmission. The latter is
also more likely in the presence of a strong processing industry.
Keywords: Asymmetric price transmission; meta-analysis; agro-food supply
chain..
JEL classifications: Q11.
1. Introduction
The debate concerning determinants of food prices has a long history in agricultural
economics. An important part of this research has focused on the extent to which
price changes are transferred along the agro-food chain. The interest that economists
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have shown over the issue of price transmission (PT) can be explained on several
grounds. Firstly, changes in prices at different points along the marketing chain may
have important consequences for the welfare of consumers and/or producers and are
thus of concern to policy-makers (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001).2 Secondly, in line with
long-established arguments, prices convey information about scarcity (Hayek, 1945;
Stiglitz, 2000). As a consequence, investigating price movements along the marketing
chain could be relevant to understanding whether resources employed in agro-food
production are allocated efficiently. Thirdly, the analysis of transmission of commod-
ity price changes through to retail food prices can be informative for the discussion
about price competition in the food sector and therefore of interest to competition
authorities (McCorriston, 2002).
To better understand the nature of price movements, economists have made some
effort to analyse the magnitude, direction and speed with which price movements are
transmitted along the various stages of the agro-food chain (from farm to processing
and retail levels or vice versa). One of the concerns over price transmission is that the
pass-through is not perfect and price responses following positive and negative shocks
exhibit asymmetry. In fact, it is taken for granted not just by the general public, but
often by economists as well, that output prices respond faster to input price increases
than to decreases, thus inducing asymmetrical price transmission (APT).
There is now an extensive literature dealing with price transmission (see Meyer and
von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004 for a comprehensive overview). While several studies
have greatly improved our understanding of the measurement and existence of price
transmission, two are especially worth mentioning. Firstly, von Cramon-Taubadel
(1998) reconciled PT testing with modern time-series techniques and thus paved the
way for others to follow by adopting a similar approach. Secondly, in a much cited
work, Peltzman (2000), using an impressive dataset, analysed 77 consumer and 165
producer goods in the United States and concluded that prices rise faster than they
fall, boosting new empirical research with respect to PT. With the further evolution of
time-series econometrics, new, non-linear approaches have flourished, yet again
boosting PT analysis.
The conclusions of empirical research with respect to symmetrical or asymmetrical
transmission, however, vary greatly depending on the sector tested, the methodologi-
cal approach and/or the frequency of data used in the analysis (von Cramon-Tauba-
del et al., 2006). Asymmetries in price transmission have been detected in some
countries and sectors but not in others. This leads to a general conclusion that the
presence of (a)symmetric price transmission is conditional on local circumstances. It is
disturbing though, that the exact mechanisms through which these local conditions
affect the nature of price movements remain mostly unknown.
This is somewhat surprising as many papers offer theoretical arguments intended to
explain why price transmission in the agro-food sector could be asymmetric. In fact,
as far as the causes of price transmission asymmetries are concerned, the recent litera-
ture has paid much more attention to theory than empirics. Notable exceptions that
tried to explain empirically asymmetric price adjustments along the agro-food market-
ing chain include Peltzman (2000) and Richards et al. (2012). In this paper we
2Clearly, the impact of price adjustments on the welfare of consumers is likely to be the opposite
of the impact on the welfare of producers. This, however, ultimately depends on the specific nat-
ure of price movements along the marketing chain and the characterisation of the food sector
(for a discussion see, for example, Sexton and Lavoie, 2001).
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contribute to the literature by further attempting to link the presence/absence of price
transmission asymmetries to market characteristics in a specific sector. We focus on
the role of market structure, a factor which is commonly mentioned as an underlying
reason for asymmetries in price transmission (McCorriston et al., 1998, 2001; Sexton
and Lavoie, 2001). Interestingly, researchers have not reached a consensus with
respect to the relationship between market structure and the pattern of price adjust-
ments along the marketing chain. This paper seeks to illuminate this association.
The weak connection between theory and empirical applications is mainly related
to the difficulty in incorporating competing theory predictions into empirical analyses.
Whilst the theory focuses on both the demand and supply side effects on the speed or
magnitude of price transmission, empirical research is largely confined to establishing
whether transmission is symmetric or not. This is due to the inherent nature of the
econometric PT testing approach, making it rather difficult to directly incorporate
potential determinants of PT into models. Most empirical research largely follows the
post-cointegration approach, albeit with increasingly sophisticated econometrics, that
exclusively uses prices at various stages of the marketing chain to derive (a)symmetric
price transmission models. Thus, researchers wishing to establish and empirically test
causes for asymmetry are left with three complementary options. One is to build a
structural econometric model for a specific sector to analyse the causes of asymmetric
price transmission. The second is a two stage estimation adopted by Peltzman (2000).
In the first stage, sector-specific degrees of asymmetry are estimated for a (large) num-
ber of supply chains to derive a left-hand-side variable (the statistic of the symmetry
test or a dummy variable distinguishing between symmetry and asymmetry). This
dependent variable is then regressed in a second stage on a set of market-specific
explanatory variables. The third alternative is based on a meta regression analysis
(MRA) (Stanley and Jarrell 1, 1989). First used in medical research, this approach, after
some initial resistance, has been discovered and adopted as a useful tool by social sci-
entists, including economists (Stanley, 2001). It is based on an analysis of empirical
analyses, where the data consist of results and characteristics of the existing studies.
In this paper, we adopt this latter approach and do so for two main reasons. Firstly,
compared to the alternative approaches mentioned above, meta-analysis allows us to
exploit country/sector variations in market characteristics which would be very diffi-
cult to achieve with other approaches. MRA also seems to be much less data demand-
ing as the results of price transmission models come from the existing studies.
Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically link asym-
metric price transmission with market structure using a meta-analysis perspective.
The paper closest to our work is the study by Frey and Manera (2007), which uses
meta-analysis to link the presence of price transmission asymmetries to methodologi-
cal characteristics of the identified studies. We differ from this work in two key ways.
Firstly, we concentrate on research published after 2002. As a result, our sample has
only two common papers with theirs.3 This could be important, since the results from
recent papers are presumed to be based on a more robust methodology, encompassing
continuous improvements in time-series econometrics. Thus we aim to reduce the risk
of biased results caused by misspecification errors that may have affected earlier price
transmission studies. Secondly, Frey and Manera (2007) document only the
3While Frey and Manera (2007) include papers analysing food products, their focus is not on
the agricultural and food sector. Instead, our sample is restricted to this research area.
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relationship between the presence of price (a)symmetry and methodological
approaches used in the analysed studies. Instead we link price transmission (a)symme-
try to institutional characteristics of sectors/markets under investigation, whilst con-
trolling for methodological differences. This is important as it allows us to relate our
results to existing theoretical predictions. Thus, in addition to applying the “old
approach” to new data, we also present new results. That said, owing to data limita-
tions, we mainly focus on the structural features of the food chain. More specifically,
we draw on theories explaining why market structure may impinge on price transmis-
sion. Theory also provides us with other competing explanations of asymmetric pric-
ing. What we uncover therefore is only part of the picture. We nonetheless believe
that this approach may still offer some new insights on the phenomenon of (a)sym-
metric price transmission and thus may provide an additional perspective on the
issues in question.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Next we present some of the
underlying theories of the causes of APT followed by the discussion of the empirical
approach. Section 4 presents the papers, data and variables used in this research.
Section 5 presents and discusses our results whilst the last section concludes.
2. Asymmetric Price Transmission – Existing Theories and Empirical Findings
Some research on the characteristics of food markets suggests that these markets are
typically oligopolistic (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001; Sheldon and Sperling, 2003), allow-
ing the exercise of market power by downstream industries. It is not surprising that
among the arguments4 that have been provided to account for asymmetric price
movements the most commonly cited is the presence of market power in retail and/or
processing industries (see, for example, McCorriston et al., 1998, 2001). Generally it
is expected that downstream food enterprises, being able to exert market power, trans-
mit price movements which threaten their marketing margin faster than price move-
ments which improve it (McCorriston et al., 1998; Von Cramon-Taubadel, 1998).
More specifically, market power in downstream sectors may affect price transmission
by depressing purchasing prices in upstream sectors below the level of a perfectly
functioning market, and/or deterring entry or fostering exit. While this explanation is
in line with intuition, it should be stressed that it is not self-evident and, as argued in
several theoretical and empirical papers, the decisive role attributed to market power
with respect to asymmetrical price transmission can be questioned. The risk of losing
market share or being punished for deviating from collusive behaviour, as well as the
cost structure of a downstream industry, may substantially affect the degree of price
transmission in an oligopolistic environment in either direction. Hence, the relation-
ship between market power and degree (and direction) of price transmission is not
clear. In a review of papers estimating market power in agri-food chains, Pere-
khozhuk et al. (2012) emphasise that the results of “market structure models designed
to test for market power vary considerably with respect to model structure, functional
forms and estimation methods”. The theoretical model of Tappata shows that “con-
trary to public opinion and previous work suggesting collusive behavior as the cause
of asymmetric pricing … it can well be the outcome in non-cooperative markets”
4This list is by no means exhaustive. A comprehensive discussion of types, causes and testing
approaches of APT is provided in the survey by Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004).
 2013 The Agricultural Economics Society
4 Zoltan Bakucs, Jan Fałkowski and Imre Fert}o
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
(Tappata, 2009, p. 685). Moreover, as showed by Azzam (1999), considering spatially
competitive retailers facing concave spatial demand, asymmetric price transmission
may also happen in a competitive environment. Similarly, the empirical paper on
gasoline market price transmission by Kaufmann and Laskowski (2005, p. 1,595)
concludes that “non-competitive behaviors probably are not to blame” for APT. The
complexity in the relationship between market power and APT is well illustrated by
Peltzman (2000) who uses two proxies for market power (the number of competing
firms and market concentration indices) to explain APT and reaches conflicting con-
clusions. Whilst a lower number of competing firms in a sector increases asymmetries,
higher market concentration indices decrease asymmetries. More recently Richards
et al. (2012) also found results “contrary to the conventional wisdom” that market
power induces faster retail price decreases and slower retail price increases. While
these mixed results call for more evidence on the relationship between market struc-
ture and asymmetric pricing, it should be emphasised that a number of other explana-
tions have been provided. For instance, asymmetric price transmission can also result
from search costs (Miller and Hayenga, 2001). In such cases, customers, although
having a finite choice of competing retailers, may not be able to find relevant price
information because of search costs, enabling retailers to exercise local market power.
Thus, firms may quickly raise the retail price as the producer price rises, and reduce
them much more slowly should upstream prices decline. Richards et al. (2012) test
consumer search behaviour on retail price pass-through using retail and wholesale
scanner data of ready-to-eat cereals and confirm that consumer search costs cause
faster price increases and slower price falls.
Other reasons for asymmetric price transmission include the so-called “menu costs”
argument (i.e. costs occurring with the re-pricing and the adoption of a new pricing
strategy (see, for example, Bailey and Brorsen, 1989; Levy et al., 1997). More recently,
Ray et al. (2006) provide theoretical and empirical evidence for the wholesale level
asymmetric price adjustment “in the small” for goods characterised by inelastic
demand. Ray at al. (2006, p. 131) conclude that “a small wholesale price increase is
more profitable because manufacturers will not lose customers from higher retail
prices; yet, a small decrease is less profitable, because it will not lower retail prices;
hence, there is no extra revenue from greater sales”. Big price changes are however
adjusted, since the cost of adjustment is offset by the increase in the revenue of retailers.
Further, the downward stickiness of retail prices may be explained by the presence
of inflation (see Ball and Mankiw, 1994). This reasoning is based on the fact that infla-
tion automatically carries out some of the adjustment needed in response to changes
in input prices. Chen et al. (2008), using retail scanner data, reinforce the results of
Ray et al. (2006) with respect to asymmetric adjustment “in small” and symmetric
adjustment “in large”, and also show that inflation may explain some of the transmis-
sion asymmetries.
Furthermore, Kinnucan and Forker (1987) suggest that government support is an
underlying cause of APT. They argue that government intervention (e.g. floor prices)
is common in agriculture, thus processors, wholesalers and retailers may expect that
producer price reductions are temporary, whilst increases in farm prices are likely to
be permanent, and adjust prices accordingly. Finally, various stock management prac-
tices may also generate APT (Reagan and Weitzman, 1982; Wohlgenant, 1985; Balke
et al., 1998).
We focus on the relationship between market structure and the presence of APT.
Thus we refer mainly to the arguments drawing on theories concentrating on the way
 2013 The Agricultural Economics Society
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that market organisation characteristics may affect market power and consequently
determine price transmission. We wish to complement the existing studies by propos-
ing two innovations. Firstly, we proxy the organisation of the retail sector with various
regulatory indicators that go beyond the commonly used market concentration ratios.
We also complement these measures with variables approximating market structure
and/or bargaining power of actors at other stages of the agro-food chain. In this way
we link the presence of price transmission asymmetry not only to developments in the
retail sector, but also to various characteristics of the agro-food chain as a whole. This
is important as one may assume that if market structure matters for price transmission
then it is market structure at each stage of the marketing chain (McCorriston, 2002).
Secondly, to take advantage of the fact that the market organisation varies consider-
ably across countries and/or sectors, our empirical strategy is based on meta-analysis
and draws on the results of recent papers from the price transmission field. By doing
so, we aim to complement the existing literature on price transmission by providing
some systematic evidence using a method that until now has not been widely used.
We do not aim to test all or even most of the underlying factors of price transmis-
sion (a)symmetry found in the theoretical literature. Nor do we test directly the
impact of wholesaler/processor or retailer market power upon PT.5 This is mainly due
to severe data limitations. The data on search costs, menu costs and inventory man-
agement strategies, if available at all, are rarely consistent between countries.
Research on the causes of price transmission asymmetry essentially involves making a
trade-off between the possibility of testing the range of alternative theories and the
country/sector coverage. As a consequence one has to choose between exploiting
within-country variation and testing for different theories and exploiting between-
country variation with a focus on a limited number of theories to be tested. Both of
these options have their pros and cons. We choose the latter alternative, being aware
of potential shortcomings it may have. Nevertheless, we believe that the statistical
associations that we document can still be informative for the issues. Our empirical
strategy is briefly presented below.
3. Empirical Approach
Based on the existing theoretical literature, the price transmission mechanism can be
conceptualised as a function with the form:
pcs ¼ FðXcs;ETcsÞ ð1Þ
where p denotes the variable that characterises the presence of price transmission
asymmetry, X is a vector capturing the socio-economic and market organisation
5There could be several approaches to testing the impact of market power upon PT. Firstly, one
could test directly the impact of market power by estimating a large number of country, sector
or even processing plant/retail unit specific production and supply functions (e.g. Azzam and
Pagoulatos 1990, Bakucs et al., 2010 or more recently Perekhozuk et al., 2013 using plant level
data), followed by the determination of sector- and country-specific market power parameters
(theta), later used as a regressor explaining PT. Secondly, a simpler approach is to use concen-
tration ratios of downstream levels industries as proxies for market power included as regres-
sors explaining price transmission (e.g. Peltzman, 2000). Finally, an indirect method is to relax
the assumption of constant marginal cost and compare transmission elasticities, as in McCorris-
ton et al. (2001).
 2013 The Agricultural Economics Society
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characteristics, ET controls for estimation techniques, number of observations, fre-
quency and paper publication details, both referring to country c and sector s. F(.) is
the reduced-form function that aims to capture potentially complex interactions
between these two. X includes, for instance, market structure and the regulatory
framework or bargaining power of actors operating at subsequent stages of the agro-
food supply chain. With respect to methodological variables included in vector ET, it
should be clear that they are not the prime focus of our analysis (Frey and Manera,
2007 present an excellent analysis of the impact of methodology upon PT results) and
we do not aim to assess whether these methodological approaches were appropriate.
Instead we wish to control for the impact of methodological choice on the results –
the nature of PT.
Given the fact that the within-country variation in variables included in X is lim-
ited, we focus on exploiting between-country variation. Consequently our dependent
variable draws on the results from the existing studies on price transmission (see fur-
ther), couching our empirical analysis in a meta-analysis framework. Meta-analysis is
the quantitative analysis of a body of studies and aims at evaluating the existing
empirical evidence (Stanley, 2001). While originally it was used in research areas other
than agricultural economics, it is now quickly entering this field as well. Recent
“agriculture-oriented” studies that use this approach include Hess and von Cramon-
Taubadel (2007, 2008), Gallet (2007, 2010), Johnston and Duke (2009) and Lagerkvist
and Hess (2011).
Our empirical strategy is as follows. Based on the literature review, we identify stud-
ies that investigate price behaviour in a number of countries and sectors. In line with
the MRA approach adopted by Perdiguero-Garcia (2013), we code our dependent
variable as a dummy equal to one if a given paper found asymmetric price transmis-
sion, and zero otherwise. An alternative approach could be to use as a dependent vari-
able the F-statistic of the symmetry test. This however would greatly reduce our
sample and thus bias our results since a large number of papers do not report this sta-
tistic.6 Moreover, using a dummy variable instead of F-stat as a dependent variable
helps to solve, at least to some extent, the problem of publication bias to which we
refer below. In a second step, drawing on various sources, we collect the data on vari-
ous institutional and market organisational characteristics of countries and sectors
covered by the identified studies. Given the theoretical predictions concerned with
price transmission asymmetry, we mainly focus on characteristics that may be related
to the organisation of the subsequent stages of the agro-food supply chain. Thus, our
focus is on variables approximating market structure and bargaining power of farm-
ers, processors and retailers. In this way we exploit the variation in market character-
istics across countries/sectors, helping us to overcome the main shortcoming of
“single-sector” studies that cannot measure the impact of market structure on price
transmission unless major changes in the organisation of the sector in the given coun-
try/sector occur within the study period (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004).
While the approach we follow offers an important advantage, it also creates a major
challenge. As mentioned by McCorriston (2002), finding suitable proxies for market
structure can be very difficult. On the one hand, this proxy should be uniform and
comparable across countries. On the other, it should effectively capture the behaviour
6By using F-statistics Frey and Manera (2007) admit losing 41 papers out of 70 included in the
original sample.
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of farmers/processors/retailers and not just the potential that these actors have to
behave in a certain way. We try to address these issues by using various proxies of the
market structure at subsequent stages of the agro-food supply chain and follow the lit-
erature with respect to the way we define them (see further). While the measures we
use may still be subject to the abovementioned critique, we are not aware of any more
suitable proxies that are available for such a number of countries/sectors. Thus, while
this caveat should be kept in mind when interpreting our results, we nonetheless
believe that our findings provide some new insights into the linkage between various
characteristics of the agro-food supply chain and price transmission (a)symmetry.
In addition, to address the concern that multiple-results studies may dominate our
calculations, we follow Hess and von Cramon-Taubadel (2008) and attach a weight to
the importance of each observation which is calculated as a ratio of 1 over the number
of observations resulting from the underlying study.
4. Data
Our data on the presence/absence of price transmission are taken from 35 recently
published papers. These studies focus on the agricultural sector and investigate the
price transmission mechanism for 101 cases (Table 1). To our knowledge, this is the
most comprehensive list of studies investigating price behaviour along the agro-food
chain compiled in recent years. It was drawn from various scientific databases includ-
ing Scopus, Science Direct, Emerald, EconLit, Web of Science and Google Scholar.
Next we briefly present some basic information on the studies that we use in our
analysis. Most importantly, price transmission asymmetry has been detected in 53
cases whereas in the remaining 48 cases the authors concluded that price behaviour is
symmetric. Thus our sample seems to be balanced with respect to the incidence of
price asymmetries and symmetries. That said, it should be recognised that our data
may still suffer from a sample bias stemming from the fact that studies finding asym-
metric pricing may be more easily publishable.7 We try to mitigate this problem as fol-
lows. Firstly, our sample includes not only published studies but also government
reports and working papers. Moreover, we control for this fact using relevant dum-
mies in all our regressions (see below). Secondly, we work with a dummy dependent
variable distinguishing the presence of asymmetry rather than with the cumulative
level of asymmetries. This is because “with publication selection averages of effect
magnitudes across the literature will be upwardly biased in magnitude” (Stanley,
2005, p. 311). Finally, in all our specifications we control for the number of observa-
tions used in a given analysis. This is done to account for the fact that small sample
studies, because of predictably larger standard errors, may be at a disadvantage in
identifying statistically significant results. These measures should help to mitigate the
publication bias problem. Nevertheless, the question as to whether it still affects our
results remains.
While price transmission could be analysed for different pairs of actors operating at
various stages of the agro-food supply chain, almost all of the cases that we identified
(85) relate to farm–retail price transmission. The remaining observations relate to
farm–wholesale (9) and to wholesale–retail (17) relationships. Our sample is not uni-
formly distributed over geographical regions or countries (Table 2). Most of the
7We thank an anonymous referee for making this point.
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Table 1
List of identified studies on price transmission in the agro-food chain
Paper Country Sector Frequency Period
Abdulai (2002) Switzerland Pork Monthly 1988–1997
Adachi and Liu (2009) Japan Pork Monthly 1967–2008
Amador et al. (2010) Austria Apple Monthly 1995–2010
Awokuse and Wang (2009) USA Milk Monthly 1987–2006
USA Milk Monthly 1987–2006
USA Milk Monthly 1987–2006
Bakucs et al. (2006) Germany Pork Monthly 1996–2004
Bakucs et al. (2007) Hungary Vegetables Monthly 2002–2006
Bakucs and Ferto (2005) Hungary Pork Monthly 1996–2002
Bakucs and Ferto (2006) Hungary Beef Monthly 1992–2000
Bakucs and Ferto (2008) Hungary Milk Monthly 1992–2007
Bakucs and Ferto (2009) Hungary Pork Monthly 1992–2005
Ben-Kabia and Gil (2007) Spain Lamb Weekly 1996–2002
Boetel and Liu (2010) USA Beef Monthly 1970–2008
USA Pork Monthly 1970–2008
Bolotova and Novakovic
(2012)
USA Milk Monthly 1982–2008
Bojnec and Peter (2005) Slovenia
Slovenia
Pork
Beef
Monthly
Monthly
1990–2000
1990–2000
Capps and Sherwell
(2007)
USA Milk Monthly 1994–2002
Cechura and Sobrova
(2008)
Czech
Republic
Pork Monthly 1995–2006
Chavas and Mehta (2004) USA Milk Monthly 1980–2001
Fałkowski (2010) Poland Milk Monthly 1995–2006
Gervais (2011) USA Pork Monthly 1980–2006
Guillen and Franquesa
(2010)
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Pork
Beef
Eggs
Lamb
Rabbit
Poultry
Weekly
Weekly
Weekly
Weekly
Weekly
Weekly
2005–2007
2005–2007
2005–2007
2005–2007
2005–2007
2005–2007
Hassouneh et al. (2010) Spain Beef Monthly 1996–2005
Jaffry (2005) France Fish Monthly 1989–1999
Karantininis et al. (2011) Sweden Pork Monthly 1995–2009
Lass (2005) USA Milk Monthly 1990–2001
 2013 The Agricultural Economics Society
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Table 1
(Continued)
Paper Country Sector Frequency Period
London Economics (2004) Austria
Austria
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
France
France
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Spain
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Carrot
Potato
Vegetables
Bread
Flour
Eggs
Bread
Poultry
Apple
Potato
Carrot
Poultry
Milk
Cheese
Butter
Potato
Beef
Bread
Eggs
Potato
Fruit
Vegetables
Vegetables
Beef
Lamb
Bread
Eggs
Milk
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
1997–2002
1997–2002
1985–2000
1985–2000
1985–2000
1985–1996
1990–2002
1987–2001
1987–2003
1993–2002
1993–2001
1993–2002
1995–2001
1995–2001
1995–2001
1985–2001
1994–2002
1996–2001
1990–2002
1985–2001
1987–2001
1985–2001
1987–2001
1986–2003
1986–2003
1987–2001
1992–2001
1995–2001
Luoma et al. (2004) Finland Pork Monthly 1982–2003
Finland Beef Monthly 1982–2003
Reziti and Panagopuolos
(2008)
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Vegetables
Fruit
Food
Vegetables
Fruit
Food
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
1995–2004
1995–2004
1995–2004
1995–2004
1995–2004
1995–2004
Rezitis and Reziti (2011) Greece Milk Monthly 1989–2009
Serra and Goodwin (2003) Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Milk
Milk
Milk
Milk
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
1994–2000
1994–2000
1994–2000
1994–2000
Shagaian (2007) USA Beef Weekly 1991–2005
Shagaian et al. (2008) Turkey Poultry Monthly 2003–2006
Simioni et al. (2013) France Fish Monthly 1988–1999
France Fish Monthly 1988–1999
Vavra and Goodwin (2005) USA Beef Monthly 1974–2001
USA Poultry Monthly 1980–2002
USA Egg Monthly 1972–2002
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observations, 73, are for Europe and 24 are for the United States. Moreover, five
countries, namely Spain, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Germany and United States
account for almost two thirds of the entire sample.
Furthermore, most of the cases under investigation (71) concern livestock products
(Table 3). Crop production is represented by 30 observations, and thus accounts for
roughly 38% of our sample.
Table 1
(Continued)
Paper Country Sector Frequency Period
Von Cramon-Taubadel
et al. (2006)
Germany Poultry Weekly 1995–2000
Germany Lettuce Weekly 1995–2000
Zheng et al. (2008) USA Pork Monthly 1987–2003
USA Pork Monthly 1987–2003
USA Beef Monthly 1987–2003
USA Beef Monthly 1987–2003
USA Poultry Monthly 1990–2000
USA Poultry Monthly 1990–2000
USA Egg Monthly 1991–2000
USA Egg Monthly 1991–2000
USA Potato Monthly 1993–2001
USA Tomato Monthly 1991–2001
Source: Own collation based on sample literature.
Table 2
Number of observations by country
Country N % of all obs. % of all cases detecting APT
Austria 5 5.0 5.7
Czech Republic 1 1.0 1.9
Denmark 4 4.0 0.0
Finland 2 2.0 0.0
France 5 5.0 7.5
Germany 10 9.9 3.8
Greece 7 6.9 7.5
Hungary 8 7.9 3.8
Japan 1 1.0 1.9
Netherlands 4 4.0 0.0
Poland 1 1.0 1.9
Slovenia 2 2.0 1.9
Spain 14 13.9 18.9
Sweden 3 3.0 3.8
Switzerland 1 1.0 1.9
Turkey 1 1.0 1.9
USA 24 23.8 35.8
United Kingdom 8 7.9 1.9
Total 101 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on sample literature.
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Tables 4–6 present some methodological characteristics of the studies under consid-
eration. The majority of cases, 55, couch the analysis in a linear cointegration frame-
work. A non-linear approach is used by 38 observations.
There are a few studies that are based on the earliest methodological approach to
investigating price transmission mechanism, namely pre-cointegration techniques (8
cases).8 Further, the majority of studies use monthly rather than weekly data
(Table 5). Finally, of the 78 cases that investigated the direction of price information
flow, 33 report the causality running from farm to retail, 8 report the opposite direc-
tion, whereas 33 report the causality running in both directions (Table 6).
4.1. Dependent variable
As mentioned earlier, our dependent variable shows the presence/absence of price
transmission asymmetry. Accordingly, it is a dummy variable equal to one if the paper
detects asymmetric price transmission, and equal to zero otherwise.
Table 3
Number of observations by sector
Product N % of all obs. % of all cases detecting APT
Livestock 71 70.3 84.9
Vegetables 11 10.9 7.5
Fruit 5 5.0 0.0
Food 2 2.0 3.8
Potato 7 6.9 1.9
Cereals 5 5.0 1.9
Total 101 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on sample literature.
Table 4
Number of observations by methodology
Methodology N % of all obs. % of all cases
detecting APT
Pre-cointegration Houck 8 7.9 11.3
Linear cointegration VECM 55 54.5 35.8
Non-linear
cointegration
General-to specific 3 3.0 3.8
Gregory–Hansen 7 6.9 5.7
Regime switching 1 1.0 1.9
TVECM 24 23.8 37.7
Asymmetric non-linear auto
regressive distributed lag model
3 3.0 3.8
Total 101 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on sample literature.
8As one of the earliest applications of this approach was the study by Houck (1977), in Table 4
we refer to it as the “Houck approach”.
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4.2. Independent variables
The selection of explanatory variables included in our regression is a crucial decision.
On the one hand the complexity and multi-dimensionality characterising the relation-
ship between price transmission and market structure would suggest the inclusion of
many covariates. On the other, inflating the number of variables describing market
organisation quickly reduces the degrees of freedom and induces potential multicollin-
earity in the regression results. Thus, to investigate the effect of the agro-food supply
chain characteristics upon price transmission asymmetry, we include a limited number
of covariates. We define four groups of explanatory variables.
The first group, similar to Frey and Manera (2007) albeit with less detail, are techni-
cal variables, controls for methodology, data frequency, number of observations and
a sectorial dummy variable. Variable Pre-CI is a dummy distinguishing papers that
use the pre-cointegration approach. Variable Linear_CI on the other hand is a dummy
distinguishing studies relying on vector error correction models. All other papers, i.e.
those that rely on non-linear methodologies, act as a reference group. Given that
methodological advancements in econometrics allow for a much more detailed scru-
tiny of the data, we expect the more recent methods, i.e. non-linear, to be more likely
to detect some imperfections in the price transmission mechanism and thus the pres-
ence of asymmetric price transmission. Further, as mentioned in some studies (e.g.
Frey and Manera, 2007; Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; Von Cramon-
Taubadel et al., 2006) the outcome of price transmission investigation may depend on
the frequency and aggregation characteristics of the data used. More specifically, less
frequent data may mask important adjustments (or lack of them) that occur within
shorter periods. To address this issue, in our methodological regressions we also
include the dummy variable Monthly capturing studies with monthly data frequency.
Table 6
Number of observations by direction of causality
Causality direction N % of all obs. % of all cases detecting APT
Causality farm to retail 33 42.3 60.0
Causality retail to farm 8 10.3 5.7
Causality wholesale to farm 4 5.1 5.7
Bidirectional causality 33 42.3 28.6
Total 78 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on the sample literature.
Table 5
Number of observations by data frequency
Frequency N % of all obs. % of all cases detecting APT
Monthly 91 90.1 88.7
Weekly 10 9.9 12.3
Total 101 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on the sample literature.
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Studies with weekly data act as a reference point. In accordance with the argument
presented above, we expect a negative coefficient on this variable suggesting that stud-
ies with monthly data are less likely to detect price transmission asymmetry than stud-
ies with weekly data. The number of observations used in a particular study is also
expected to influence the results, however the expectations are not obvious. Since mar-
kets may need some time to return to equilibrium, in the long term the imperfect func-
tioning of markets is less likely, favouring symmetrical transmission results. On the
other hand, as mentioned earlier, studies using large samples may be more likely to
document statistically significant results (in our case pointing to asymmetric pricing).
What should also be noted is that the number of observations is also positively corre-
lated with the data frequency. Potential interactions between our Monthly variable
and Observations variable cannot therefore be excluded. Finally, since 70% of the
studies covered in our sample focus on the livestock sector, the last variable in this
group is a dummy controlling for possible sector-dependent effects (Livestock).
The second group of explanatory variables takes into account the geographical
and, to some extent, historical characteristics of sectors/countries covered in our sam-
ple whilst also controlling for the sources from which the papers we study originated.
We classify countries into two groups: the variable Europe takes the value of 1 if the
paper is using European data, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, in some specifications we
include the dummy Western which takes the value of 1 if the study is set in an “old”
EU Member State, and 0 otherwise (i.e. for the central European countries) to control
for possible historical differences. The next two variables control for the source of the
paper, trying to capture possible publication biases. The variable Journal takes the
value of 1 if the paper has been published in a refereed journal, and 0 otherwise (work-
ing paper, OECD publication etc.).The rank of the journal is controlled by the vari-
able WOS which takes the value of 1 if the journal is included in the Web of Science
(WoS), and 0 otherwise.
The third and fourth groups of covariates in our models contain the variables of
key interest in this paper. These control for market organisational characteristics at
later stages of the supply chain. Variables in the third group focus on main character-
istics of the retail sector. In general, there are two main problems with variables that
could be used here. Firstly, the literature is divided with respect to the proxy that one
should use to measure the retailers’ bargaining power (see e.g. Meyer and von Cra-
mon-Taubadel, 2004). Secondly, even if we assume that the first problem is solved, it
is still quite difficult to find the data on a uniform measure that would be available for
more than a few countries. Given these problems and the on-going debate, we focus
here on regulations governing the retail trade and the relative position of food retail-
ers towards the manufacturing sector. Data for the three regulatory variables come
from the OECD and were collected via the OECD Regulatory Indicators Question-
naire (see Conway and Nicoletti, 2006 for a detailed discussion of these variables).
More specifically, we look at regulations related to entry barriers, operational restric-
tions and pricing policies, reflecting the institutional environment within which retail-
ers operate, regardless of their market share. Consequently they should allow us to
account, at least partly, for the incentive structure that retailers face and that drives
their behaviour, an issue which cannot be captured by a standard downstream market
power index. Also note that institutional features, including the regulations governing
retail trade, are commonly assumed to be exogenous. This is important from an
econometric point of view and presents an additional advantage over a simple market
concentration ratio which is likely to be endogenous. Clearly the validity of this
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assumption would depend on the extent to which these regulations do not vary over
time. While these data point to a number of important aspects of the functioning of
the retail sector, it should be noted that the regulatory indicators that we use concern
the whole retail sector and not just food retailing as such. This should be kept in mind
while interpreting our results. Based on these data we construct three variables:
Entry_barriers, Operational_restrictions and Price_controls. Each index is ranging
from 0 to 6 with higher values indicating more restrictive regulations. The former vari-
able refers, among others, to restrictions on the establishment of large outlets. As
such, they should strengthen the position of small- or medium-scale retailers, com-
pared to large retailers, and thus act in favour of farmers’ bargaining position vis-a-vis
the retail sector. Consequently, we expect this variable to negatively affect the proba-
bility of asymmetric pricing.9 On similar grounds, a negative sign is expected by the
variable Operational_restrictions which provides information on the flexibility of legis-
lation setting shop-opening hours. The assumption here is that these limits on hours
bind predominantly larger outlets.
As far as the expected impact of Price_controls on price transmission asymmetry is
concerned, it should be positive. This is because limits imposed on the price competi-
tion between retailers may result in stronger pressure to use a vertical pricing policy to
increase market share. Asymmetric price adjustments can be regarded as an example
of such a policy.
In some specifications we also take advantage of a commonly used market concen-
tration ratio (e.g. Peltzman, 2000). More specifically, we define Retail_CR5 as a vari-
able measuring the share of the top five retailers in total sales. The source of this
variable is the Planet Retail database (www.planetretail.com). As a more complex
alternative, reflecting not just the situation in the retail sector, but its relative position
with respect to the manufacturing sector, we use the variable Food_retail. It is defined
as a variable measuring the ratio of the average turnover per manufacturing enterprise
to the average turnover per retail enterprise. In contrast to the concentration ratio,
this variable is defined for a given agricultural sector. The average is calculated over
the period 1995–2008.10 For the European Union (EU), this variable is based on Eu-
rostat data. For the United States, the data come from the US Census Bureau Eco-
nomic Indicators. Specifications including this variable are based on a somewhat
smaller sample as for other non-EU countries the data are not available.
The fourth and final group of independent variables reflects upstream sector market
organisational characteristics. We focus only on the EU countries and the USA, since
we could not find comparable data for Japan, Switzerland or Turkey. Variable Share
measures the relative size of the farm sector, captured by the number of farm holdings
operating in a given sector (standardised over the total number of farm holdings in a
given country). The inclusion of this variable is supported by predictions originating
from the political economy literature suggesting that politicians, in order to secure
election chances, cannot ignore the interests of those groups that may provide them
with the highest numbers of votes. The assumption here is that politicians who cannot
9It should be noted, however, that entry barriers shelter incumbent retailers. Therefore, if the
market is dominated by a few large retailers, an opposite effect of entry_barriers cannot be
excluded.
10In some cases, however, data were not available for the full period, thus the average calculated
over the shorter time span was used.
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defy the majority wish need to make sure that their electorate is pleased by their
actions and proposals. Given that asymmetric price transmission is often assumed to
work in favour of downstream sectors (i.e. not in farmers’ interests), this would mean
that politicians should look for ways to foster symmetric pricing especially in those
sectors where the potential electorate is numerous. To construct this variable, we use
the EU Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) and US Department of Agricul-
ture Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS) databases.
To further account for the fact that the price transmission mechanism can be
related to government intervention, the average value of Nominal Rate of Assistance
(NRA_avg) (by product during analysed period) is included among the regressors.
The NRA measures the total transfer to agriculture as a percentage of the undistorted
unit value and comes from the World Bank Agricultural Distortion Database (www.
worldbank.org/agdistortions; for more on this database and the NRA see Anderson
and Valenzuela, 2008). It captures how much support is given to farmers relative to
the value of their production (valued using free market prices, not distorted by the
state’s intervention). The NRA is positive when agriculture is subsidised, negative
when it is taxed, and equal to zero if the net transfers are zero. The rationale for inclu-
sion of this variable in the model is based on Kinnucan and Forker (1987), who argue
that retailers/wholesalers may asymmetrically adjust prices in expectation of govern-
ment intervention on the market. More specifically, downstream sectors are likely not
to respond to reductions in producer prices if they expect the government to support
farmers. In line with this reasoning, we expect the NRA_avg to positively influence the
presence of asymmetric price transmission.
Finally, to further control for farmers’ bargaining power, we include two other
variables aiming to capture the sector’s farm structure. On the one hand, we control
for the degree of farm fragmentation (variable Small_farms). To achieve that, for the
Table 7
Descriptive statistics of variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Linear_CI 101 0.08 0.27 0 1
Pre-CI 101 0.54 0.50 0 1
Monthly 101 0.90 0.30 0 1
Livestock 101 0.70 0.46 0 1
Observations 101 5.03 0.51 3.80 6.63
Europe 101 0.73 0.44 0 1
Western 101 0.62 0.48 0 1
Journal 101 0.35 0.48 0 1
WOS 101 0.23 0.42 0 1
Entry_barriers 99 3.10 0.87 0.20 4.02
Price_control 99 1.76 0.91 0.00 4.02
Operational_restrictions 99 2.81 1.10 1.01 4.07
Food_retail 92 23.97 24.37 0.51 119.58
Retail_CR5 99 52.92 19.34 21.43 86
Share 88 0.18 0.19 0.002 0.86
NRA_avg 77 0.47 0.40 0 1.85
Small_farms 93 0.15 0.13 0.002 0.57
Large_farms 93 0.25 0.16 0.01 0.75
Source: Own calculations based on sample literature.
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EU countries we employ a proxy for the share of agricultural land utilised by farm
holdings of economic size between 0 and 4 ESU. However, the USA has a different
classification system for farm structure based on farm sales (Hoppe and Banker,
2010). Following the USDA-ERS classification we define small farms as a share of
farms with sales of less than USD 100,000. On the other hand, to also control for the
other extreme, we include the variable Large_farms. For the EU countries we mea-
sure the share of land operated by farm holdings equal to, or larger than 100 ESU.
In the USA we apply the share of farms with sales of USD 1,000,000 and more. This
variable aims to capture the relative strength of the largest farms. These data also
come from the FADN and USDA-ERS. Since it is plausible to assume that a farm’s
economic size is positively related to its bargaining position vis-a-vis the downstream
sector, we expect the variable Small_farms (Large_farms) to have a positive (nega-
tive) effect on the probability to observe asymmetric price transmission. Table 7
below displays means and standard deviations of the main variable of interest.
5. Results and Discussion
In order to examine the relationships between asymmetric price transmission and
explanatory variables, we estimated various binary models. These are typically esti-
mated by maximum likelihood after imposing distributional assumptions of error
term. However, the semi-parametric literature emphasises that parametric estimators
of discrete choice models are known to be sensitive to departures from distributional
assumptions. Various estimators have been developed for correcting this restrictive
nature of parametric models including the semi-nonparametric approach of Gallant
and Nychka (1987) and the semi parametric maximum likelihood approach of Klein
and Spady (1993). The recent literature emphasises that semi-nonparametric and
semi-parametric maximum likelihood estimators substantially dominate the paramet-
ric probit maximum likelihood estimator (De Luca, 2008). Therefore, in this paper we
employ the semi-nonparametric approach.
Based on equation (1), all four groups of variables listed above were jointly esti-
mated through Models 1 to 4 (Table 8). The baseline specification, with all possible
observations included, is reported in Model 1. Models 2, 3 and 4 present specifications
with additional covariates, reducing the number of observations available to 72, 68
and 71, respectively. We begin with a brief discussion of the results with respect to the
methodological variables. Firstly, in line with our expectations, the probability of
detecting asymmetric price transmission is higher for studies using methodological
approaches other than linear cointegration (significant in Models 1 and 2). Secondly,
asymmetries are more likely to be found in studies using weekly rather than monthly
data. This is fully in line with arguments and findings presented elsewhere (e.g. Von
Cramon-Taubadel et al., 2006; Frey and Manera, 2007). Thirdly, a larger sample size
increases the likelihood of concluding symmetrical PT. Finally, the Livestock dummy,
positive and significant in Models 3 and 4, shows that asymmetries are found more
often for livestock than for crop products.
The second group of explanatory variables considers geographical differences and
accounts for the source of studies covered in our sample. Here the results are some-
what less consistent compared to the first group of explanatory variables. The Europe
dummy is significant in three models, albeit negative in Models 1 and 2, and positive
when all covariates are included (Model 4).
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The Western dummy is negative and significant across Models 2–4, suggesting that
studies set in “old” EU Member States are more likely to identify symmetrical trans-
mission than those reported in central-eastern European papers. The Journal dummy
is significant and negative across estimations. It follows that journal papers are more
likely to produce symmetric transmission results. This in turn might point to some
publication bias in the data used. The dummy representing whether the paper was
published in a journal included in the Web of Science (WOS) or not is significant in
all four models, but positive in larger sample estimations and negative when the sam-
ple size is reduced due to the inclusion of further explanatory variables. A positive
coefficient suggests a higher probability of asymmetric results in WoS whereas a nega-
tive coefficient implies the opposite. The Akaike and Schwarz–Bayesian information
criteria (the last two rows of Table 8) also reach contradictory conclusions, thus the
true effect of journal ranking is unclear.
We now turn to the core results of this paper, namely the linkage of the presence of
price transmission asymmetries to the market organisational characteristics of the
agro-food chain. The main results are reported in the lower two sections of Table 8.
Firstly, estimation results for all variables in groups 3 and 4 are consistent and mostly
significant (especially in Models 3 and 4). Starting with the impact of regulations
affecting the retail sector, we find that asymmetric price transmission is less likely in a
scenario where retailers’ activities are constrained by Entry_barriers regulations and
this result seems to be very robust. This result is in line with our expectations. One
may assume that entry barriers, if put in place, are mostly directed against large-scale
Table 8
Price transmission asymmetries – semi-nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Linear_CI –0.85*** –2.06*** 0.34 –0.61
Pre-CI 0.62 –0.07 0.51 2.66**
Monthly –0.69* –1.84*** –2.19*** –3.08***
Livestock –0.12 –0.20 2.58*** 2.31***
Observations 0.04 –0.61*** –2.51*** –3.75***
Europe –1.67*** –2.06*** 0.50 12.19***
Western –0.38 –2.42*** –3.94*** –8.17***
Journal –1.15*** –0.99*** –3.55*** –6.68***
WOS 0.85*** 0.78** –1.97*** –4.53***
Entry_barriers –1.12*** –1.38*** –2.54***
Price_control 1.41*** 1.11*** 0.25
Operational_restrictions 0.19 1.19** 2.33***
Food_retail –0.03***
Retail_CR5 –0.28***
Share –0.56 –6.13*** –9.88***
NRA_avg 0.36 1.27* –0.80
Small_farms 10.33*** 19.53***
Large_farms 0.64 –10.27***
N 101 72 68 71
AIC 55.24 52.38 52.31 49.56
BIC 89.24 93.36 98.92 97.08
Source: Own calculations.
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retailers. This, in turn, should act in favour of smaller retailers, possibly allowing
them to increase their market share and thus in favour of farmers whose bargaining
position vis-a-vis smaller retailers is stronger. Consequently, our results are consistent
with the considerations stating that the more balanced the bargaining power of farm-
ers and retailers, the more likely it is that one should observe symmetric price trans-
mission. This argument finds also support in the effect of variables capturing the
degree of farm fragmentation/concentration (see below).
Surprisingly, we find some evidence that price transmission is more likely to be
asymmetric in the presence of regulations restricting shop opening hours (Opera-
tional_restrictions). We would have expected this variable to affect the price transmis-
sion mechanism in a similar manner as Entry_barriers, and more research into this
specific regulation is necessary to explain this discrepancy.
Further, robust results (Price_control variable) indicate that price movements tend
to be more asymmetric if price competition between retailers is limited (price con-
trols may forbid, for instance, dumping prices/keeping retail prices too low). A pos-
sible interpretation for this result is that, as price controls (strongly) limit the set of
“horizontal-competition” tools that retailers may use to increase their market share,
they may resort to “vertical-competition” tools, i.e. try to increase their market
share through delayed and/or asymmetric adjustments in prices along the supply
chain.
We next look at the potential impact of the size and concentration of the retail
industry. Two alternative variables are used here. In Model 3, the variable Food_retail
emphasises that farm–retail price transmission asymmetry is less likely to occur when
food manufacturing turnover (per enterprise) relative to retailers’ turnover is higher.
A potential explanation draws on the fact that in the situation where the processing
industry plays a dominant role in the supply chain, price asymmetries may appear in
farm–processor and processor–retailer relationships. In such cases, farm and retail
prices may move together, so symmetric transmission is more likely to be observed. In
Model 4, the more conventional concentration ratio of the five largest retailers
(Retail_CR5) is used instead of the relative weight of manufacturing with respect to
the retailing sector (Food_retail). At first glance, the significantly negative sign of the
explanatory variable looks counterintuitive, suggesting that higher retail concentra-
tion leads to symmetrical transmission. However, this result is not unprecedented.
Peltzman (2000) finds that, when retail concentration (instead of number of competi-
tors) is used to explain PT, the result is less asymmetry. Swinnen and Vandeplas
(2010) discuss the more complex and nuanced effect that retail concentration has on
efficiency and rent distribution in supply chains, presenting a number of papers reach-
ing contradictory results. The authors develop a theoretical model and show that the
concentration growth has contributed to welfare gains through scale effects, and con-
clude that “in the presence of market imperfections and contract enforcement prob-
lems, efficiency premiums in vertically coordinated contract arrangements may
provide additional benefits to farmers” (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2010, p. 118), i.e.
higher concentration does not necessarily translate into the abuse of downstream mar-
ket power.
Finally, the fourth group of explanatory variables assesses the impact of upstream
(farm) sector market organisational characteristics upon PT. The coefficient of the
Share variable is persistently negative and in most cases statistically significant. It
follows that the bigger the relative size of the sector under investigation, the lower
the probability of asymmetric price transmission. As we argued above, a possible
 2013 The Agricultural Economics Society
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explanation of the negative coefficient might be that a higher share of farms operat-
ing in a specific sector with respect to total number of farms reflects the importance
of that sector for politicians and regulators. This refers to political economy consid-
erations that put both social as well as voting issues to the fore. Regarding the
impact of government intervention, we find weak evidence that is in line with the
theory formulated by Kinnucan and Forker (1987). More specifically, we find a
positive influence on price transmission asymmetry, suggesting that downstream
industries are (perfectly) aware and anticipate government farm intervention when
deciding upon pricing strategies. This result however is statistically significant only
in one model (Model 3).
The last two explanatory variables provide further insights about the role that farm
structure may play in the price transmission mechanism. Asymmetric movements are
positively correlated with the share of land operated by the smallest holdings
(Small_farms) and negatively correlated with the share of land used by Large_farms11
(Models 3 and 4). These results (Table 8) seem to be very robust, suggesting that the
presence of asymmetric price transmission is more (less) likely the more fragmented
(concentrated) is the farm structure which is fully consistent with expectations.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the underlying reasons for price transmission (a)symme-
tries. Our methodology rests on meta-analysis and thus empirical results obtained
from a number of studies in the field. More specifically, we try to relate the presence/
absence of price transmission asymmetry in farm–retail relationships detected by the
existing studies to various characteristics of the agro-food supply chain. Our focus is
on factors that are likely to affect the bargaining power of actors operating at subse-
quent stages of the supply chain. This is motivated by the fact that the presence of
market power in the downstream sectors of the agro-food chain is often quoted as the
reason for price transmission asymmetries. Yet, notwithstanding its appealing nature,
this argument is not self-evident and there are both theoretical and empirical studies
that argue that the relationship between market power and asymmetric pricing need
not be positive. In response, in this paper we aim at providing some more evidence on
this. In addition, we investigate the extent to which the results found in the literature
on price transmission are influenced by the methodological approaches that formed
the basis for these findings.
Overall, our results are in line with the existing theories predicting that price trans-
mission asymmetries are more likely in the presence of factors negatively affecting
farmers’ bargaining power. More specifically, we find that asymmetries are present in
sectors with higher numbers of fragmented farm producers and less likely to occur
with more concentrated farm structures. Interestingly, the price transmission mecha-
nism seems to be symmetric in sectors that are likely to have high political clout.
Moreover, and in line with findings from other studies (e.g. Peltzman, 2000), our
results point to a positive association between symmetric price transmission and
retailers’ market power as measured by a seller concentration index. This in turn may
suggest that food markets are characterised by imperfections which provide additional
11As discussed in the variables description section, the measure of small and large farms is not
uniform for Europe and USA.
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benefits to farmers (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2010). Further, price transmission asym-
metries seem to be related to the regulatory framework that governs the operation of
the retail sector. Our results suggest that asymmetries are less likely in the presence of
entry barriers to retail trade but more likely in the presence of operational restrictions
that affect shop opening hours. On the other hand, distortions in the price relationship
between retailers and suppliers are more likely to occur in the presence of regulations
limiting price competition between retailers. Finally, we provide some evidence to
show that the farm–retail price relationship tends to be asymmetric in the presence of
governmental intervention and symmetric in the presence of a strong processing sec-
tor. The latter may be valid if processors are dominant players in the supply chain
and thus influence both farm and retail prices.
The main message that comes out of these results is that price transmission asym-
metry should not be seen only from the perspective of retailer’s market power.
Equally, if not more, important seems to be the market structure at other stages of the
food chain. Therefore, policy actions that aim at correcting asymmetric pricing could
target both upstream and downstream sectors. This seems to be particularly impor-
tant for countries/settings where considerable structural changes are still expected.
That said, and this is the second implication that arises from our work, one should
remember that price transmission asymmetries could result from politicians’ actions.
It follows that the patterns of price adjustments can be seen as an outcome of complex
interactions between various motivations of not only actors operating at subsequent
stages of the food chain, but also of political elites.
Obviously, our results come with several caveats. First, there is a question as to
what extent our results are affected by the so-called omitted variables bias. Note
that our data do not provide any information about consumer search costs, stock
management practices or menu costs that are factors mentioned as important price
transmission determinants in addition to market power. This, in turn, may impact
our results. Further, we do not have any direct measure of the bargaining power of
agents operating at subsequent stages of the supply chain. Consequently, we have to
rely on proxies. This raises the question of whether these proxies are indeed appro-
priate. While we go beyond the commonly used seller concentration ratios, our mea-
sures may still be criticised as capturing only the potential to exercise market power
and need not imply this power being actually exploited. Nevertheless, we believe
that the approach that we have adopted can help to improve our understanding of
the factors responsible for asymmetric price movements. Clearly, much remains to
be done. However we hope this paper is a building block towards bridging the gap
between theory and empirics with respect to the causes of (a)symmetric price
transmission.
Two findings that arise from our work could be especially interesting and worthy of
further investigation. Firstly, our results suggest that a fruitful line for future research
on price transmission could be to analyse it from a political economy perspective. It
seems particularly interesting to analyse to what extent price transmission could be
affected by the strategic behaviour of politicians aiming at winning the elections. Sec-
ondly, our results suggest that, except for horizontal price competition, downstream
sectors in the agro-food chain may use vertical price competition. While intriguing,
this point has received relatively little attention in the agricultural economics
literature.
 2013 The Agricultural Economics Society
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